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In memorial:
This comment is dedicated to the memory of Korey Stringer, 1974-2001,
"a truly remarkable man who was an outstandinghusband,father and
football player. 2
"Stringer... never saidgoodbye when he ended a conversation."3
"He always said 'peace.' ' 4
"I loved it when he said 'peace."5
1.INTRODUCTION
6
On Tuesday, July 31, 2001, Korey Stringer, a 335-pound Pro Bowl
football tackle for the Minnesota Vikings walked offthe team's training field,
at the end of morning practice.7 The temperature on the field was ninety
plus degrees' while the humidity raised the heat index to 110 degrees. 9
Despite being sick with heatstroke' ° during practice, Stringer did not
complain until the conclusion of practice, when he summoned a trainer and
was taken unconscious to the hospital." Fifteen hours later, he was
pronounced dead. 2 Stringer's death "sent shock waves" 3 throughout the
football world. The day after Stringer's death, fellow professional football

2

Jarrett Bell, Korey Stringer 1974-2001 'We Lost a Good Man', USATODAY, Aug. 2,2001, at IC

(quoting Red McCombs).
3
BobVelin, StringerFarFromnOrdinary,USAToDY, Aug. 2,2001,at3C (quotingJeanne Marie
Lukas, awriter who spent four days with Stringer one month before his death).
4
5

Id.
Id.

6
The National Football League All-Star Game.
http://www.nfl.com/probowl200l.
7
See Bell, supra note 2,at 1C.

See NFL website, available at

8

Id.
Id.
to
Steve Sternberg, Heat, Dehydration CombineforDeadly Results, USA TODAY, Aug. 2,2001, at 2C.
If you take a 335-pound man, dress him in football gear and send him to practice in 90-plus
degree weather, the hear becomes his major adversary. Facing those conditions Tuesday,
Minnesota Vikings Pro Bowl tackle Korey Stringer collapsed and later died, apparently of
heatstroke. Stringer's peak body temperature, 108 degrees, was high enough to literally break
down the proteins that make up the brain, heart, kidneys, and nerves.
9

13

See Bell, supra note 2,at 1C.
See id.
Tom Pedulla, Players,Coaches Taking Extra Care in Preseason,USA TODAY, Aug. 2,2001, at 2C.
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players were quoted discussing the reluctance, on the part of the players, to
freely express themselves on the matter ofworkplace conditions: "You don't
want to show the coaches you're slowing down. ..."14 "It's your macho
mentality - only the strongest survive."' s Just barely a month earlier, 300
newly drafted NFL players were admonished, at the National Football
League's 6 annual Rookie Symposium, to "[k]eep your mouth shut and
listen." 7 Professional football players have been conditioned to refrain from
free expression in the workplace often to the detriment of their own health,
safety, and lives."'
In contrast to a growing concern over the health and safety of
professional football players; and at a time when an open dialog regarding
workplace conditions in the professional sports world has reached a level of
critical importance," the Cincinnati Bengals have demanded that its players
sign a restricted speech addendum to their contract that "would allow the
14
Jon Saraceno, Stinger's Death Raises Tough Issues, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2001, at 3C (quoting
New York Giants tackle Lomas Brown).
15
Id.
16
Brown v. Pro Football, 518 U.S. 231, 233 (1996) ("National Football League..., a group of

football clubs.").
17
Carucci, supra note 1.
Is
Diane Pucin, The Inside Track;Jackson Wjll Bea Problein, Not Part ofthe Solution, LA TiMEsBAug.
17, 2001, at Sports, Part 4.
What should happen now that eight young football players--one NFL all-pro, three from top20 college programs, three teenagers from high school teams and most recently an eighthgrader-have died either during or shortly after football workouts in the last seven months is
a gathering of resources, a sharing of information, a concerted effort by coaches, trainers,
doctors, players, parents, the NCAA, the universities, the school boards and the fans to find
out what has gone so very wrong.
19
See, e.g., Thomas George, On Pro Football; Players Take Back Their Bodies, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 15,
2001, at DI.
"Absolutely, no question about it," said Jerome Bettis, the Pittsburgh runningback
entering his ninth season. "But I've talked to a lot of guys around the league now, and every
one of them has the same sense of urgency to be more careful about everything relating to this
game.
The feeling now is if you're tired, if you're sick, you're coming out. We're telling
backups to be even more prepared and ready. It's an attitude that is permeating throughout
the NFL because these deaths have put a different twist on the game.
Everythings a little more scrutinized. Everything has to be more in order. It's a
whole new ballgame."
10
The addendum reads as follows:
ADDENDUM 1
SIGNING BONUS
BETWEEN Cincinnati Bengals AND __
As additional consideration for the execution of NFL Player Contract(s) for the year(s)
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team to take away all or part of a player's signing bonus if he publicly criticizes
team officials, coaches, or teammates."2 During a period in which players are
feeling a "sense ofurgency"22 regarding workplace conditions; this restriction
on a player's speech could set "a precedent that could reverberate throughout
the NFL."23 The restriction on speech is contrary to the public policy
interest of the sports world and will chill a player's right of free expression
in connection with his duties as an employee of the various NFL clubs
around the country. When asked if he felt that the addendum restricting his
speech might impact his ability to perform in his job as a professional football
player, Bengals starting quarterback 24 Jon Kitna replied, "it might [affect the
ability of] some of the guys" his teammates. '
and for Player's adherence to all provisions of said Contract(s), Club agrees to pay
_
_
payable within 10 days of execution of this rider subject to the
Player the sum of
terms below.
In the event Player fails or refuses to report to Club, fails or refuses to practice or play with
Club, or leaves Club without its consent, or if Player is suspended by NFL or Club for
Conduct Detrimental, or if Player is suspended for violations of the NFL Policy and Program
for Drugs or Abuse and Alcohol or if Player makes any public comment to the media,
including but not limited to the newspaper, magazines, television, radio or internet that
breaches Player's obligation of loyalty to Club and/or undermines the public's respect for the
Club, Club coaches, or Club management under Paragraph 2 of Player's NFL Player Contract
and Article LV, Section 6 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement...upon demand by Club,
Player shall forfeit and shall immediately return and refund to the Club that amount of the
bonus herein provided as follows:
_

(A) Voluntary Breach or Failure to Perform before

(B) If Club exercises option pursuant to addendum 3, Voluntary Breach or Failure to
but on or before
Perform, other than Player's Voluntary Retirement for the NFL, after _
Player hereby expressly authorizes the club, in its sole discretion, to deduct and set offat any
time and from time to time all or part of any sums owed by Player to Club [in the event of a
breach of contract requiring a refund of signing bonus) from any current or deferred wages,
salaries, bonuses and/or additional consideration owed to Player by Club
No term or condition of the Contract, and no breach thereof, shall be waived, altered or
modified, except by written instrument.
Club
Player
(Player Contract).
21
Tom Groeschen, Bengals' Loyalcy Clause is Upheld; Will be Included in 'Most' Contracts, THE
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,Jan. 23,2001, at DO1 (emphasis added).
George, supra note 19, at D1.
Id. (emphasis added).
l3
24
Chuck Ludwig, Kitna Rises to Top of QB Battle; Smith Falls to Third, DAYTON DAILY NEWsJuly
available at
in
THE SPORTING NEWS,
reprinted
2000,
31,
http://www.cincypost.com/bengals/2001/qbs072301.html Uon Kitna was selected by Coach Dick LeBeau
as the starting quarterback for the season's preseason opener against Chicago.).
2
Interview during autograph session after practice at the team's training camp facility located
at Georgetown College, Georgetown, Kentucky on July 23, 2001. Mr. Kitna's full reply was, "Not me.
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This comment argues that professional football players are entitled to full
rights of free expression as public figures and members of the National
Football League Players Association, a labor union organization. More
particularly, the arguments in this comment focus on the requirement made
by the restrictions on free expression, known as the Pickens Clause and/or
Loyalty Clause26 forced on its players by the Cincinnati Bengals. Section II of
this comment describes the NFL player's salary structure and the restricted
speech provision of the player's contract with the Cincinnati Bengals. The
remainder of the comment is divided into two basic arguments. Part A
(Section III) contains a discussion on the doctrine of unconscionability
including its place in the Uniform Commercial Code and, more importantly,
the application of the doctrine of unconscionability to the general law of
contracts and its application to the Carl Pickens clause. The second portion
of the paper, Part B (Section IV), addresses the constitutional and legal issues
surrounding the Bengal's restriction on the player's right to free speech. This
part begins with a discussion of the right of free expression under the First
Amendment and the historical evolution of free expression before its
inclusion in the Constitution. The right to free speech in the workplace
applies to the state; however, under some circumstances a private party steps
into the shoes of the state for constitutional purposes. In this case, the
publicly financed stadium leased to the Bengals on favorable terms creates a
nexus that renders the Bengals a state actor responsible in the same manner
as an agency of the state for the free speech provisions of the Federal
Constitution. Then, the second portion of the comment describes the
provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement Antidiscrimination
Clause, which provide protection of free expression to the players. Finally,
Part B provides a description of the entitlement to free expression due to the
players as members of an organized labor organization. Section V then
concludes this comment.

H. BACKGROUND
A. NFL Players' Salary Structure
Professional football players are compensated through a variety of
sources. A player's compensation may be composed of his salary, signing
bonus, roster bonus, off-season workout bonus, All Pro bonus and ProIt might affect some ofthe guys. I answer to a higher power - a higher authority. If I have something to
say [about management], I'll say it through my agent." Representatives of the Bengal's management
refused to grant an interview.
3
Groeschen, supra note 21, at D01.
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Bowl bonus.27 Each team is limited in the total amount of money they may
pay their players during a given season. This limit is known as a Salary Cap
which is defined as the "absolute maximum amount of Salary that each Club
may pay or be obligated to pay or provide to players or Player Affiliates, or
may pay or be obligated to pay to third parties at the request of and for the
benefit of Players or Player Affiliates, at any time during a particular League
Year."2" The Salary Cap includes the following: Paragraph 5 salary,29 the
roster bonus,' off-season workout bonus"' and prorated signing bonus.32
The signing bonus is a huge component for the players, because all or part
of it is paid "up front." For example, at the time of this writing, the
Cincinnati Bengals number one draft pick for the 2001-2002 Season,Justin
Smith, was asking for a $10 million dollar signing bonus.33 The provision
of the Pickens Clause puts that entire amount of money at risk for the player.

27

Professor Richard L. Katz, Lecture at Northern Kentucky University Sports Law Course

(Spring 2001).
1
NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement 1993-2003 (As Amended June 6, 1996) (Collective
BargainingAgreetent).
S
"'Paragraph 5 Salary' means the compensation set forth in paragraph 5 of the NFL Player
Contract, or in any amendments thereto." Id.
30
"That amount of money that a team promises to pay to a player for being on the team roster."
(Note: Each team is limited to 63 players during the season). Katz, supra note 27, at Glossary for
accompanying course text.
31
"[T]hat amount of money which the team pays the player to perform conditioning workout
after the season, but before the next season." Id.
32
Ron Del Duca, The Salary Cap Must-Read Salary Cap 101, available at
http://www.ravensnests.conVsalary-cap.htm#RonDelDuca'sJulyl4,1999Article.
Signing bonuses and any amounts treated as signing bonuses are prorated equally over the
length of the player's contract for purposes of calculating the player's salary cap number. For
example, ifa $5 million signing bonus is paid on a five-year contract, the signing bonus will
count $1 million annually against the team salary for each of the five years even though the
player receives the full $5 million in the first year. The amount of the signing bonus is simply
divided by the number ofcontract years. Note, however, ifa player is released or retires before
the end of the contract period, the general rule isthat the remaining portion of the salary cap
is accelerated so that the entire remaining portion of the bonus amount is recognized against
the team's salary in the year the player's employment terminates.
3
Reporter Stan Keeler of the Cincinnati Post wrote "Steiner is believed to be seeking a signing
bonus that exceeds the $8.47 million given to last year's No. 4 pick, Peter Warrick and a total package
worth at least $4 million per season. The Bengals are reluctant to lay out a big bonus because they can only
amortize such a bonus through the 2003 season." Stan Keeler, Heated Start for QB Derby, THE
CINCtNNATIPosTJuly23,2001,availabkathttp.//www.cincypost.com/bengals/2001/bengnt072301.html.
The following day, Keeler reported 'Steiner is believed to be seeking about a $10 million signing bonus
and an 8% increase in average value over the six-year contract signed last summer by Peter Warrick, the
Bengals' No. 1 pick in 2000." Stan Keeler, Dugans Still in WR Picture,THE CINCINNATI POST,July 24,
2001, at http://www.cincypost.com/bengals/2001/bengnt072401.html.
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The Club, "in its sole discretion," 31 is entitled to automatically withhold the
bonus and/or set off from future earnings the signing bonus at any time that
the Club feels the player has made "any public comment to the
media . . . that breaches Player's obligation of loyalty to Club and/or
undermines the public's respect for the Club, Club coaches, or Club
management." 36 In this example, the current season's number one draft pick
could lose up to $10 million dollars for making an inadvertent statement to
the media that the Club felt was a breach of loyalty to the Club under the
subjective test of the Pickens Clause.
B. Carl Pickens Clause
The Pickens Clause restrains a player's right to free expression by
penalizing the player by taking away all or part of a player's signing bonus for
any public comment to the media that the management of the Club
determines to have been disloyal to the Club.37 "The clause was created in
response to Carl Pickens, a wide receiver who tried to get released from his
contract... by making brassy and negative statements about the Bengals
chain of command. Bad words, he hoped.., might lead the Bengals to fire
him."38 Pickens, a wide receiver signed a $23.3 million contract with the
Bengals in 1999 and later criticized the Bengals 39 for retaining Coach Bruce
Coslet. ° Pickens, bound by contract, 4' wanted to have an opportunity to
move to another team. By criticizing the club, Pickens thought he could be
released from his contract and become a free agent.42 He would then be

35

The Cincinnati Bengals.
Pickens Clause (Agreement on file with author.).

36

Id.

37

See Groeschen,supra note 21, at D01.
John Eckberg, BeNiceto YourBosses, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,June 19,2000, at Opinion.
See, e.g., Ron Borges, Krafi DecisionsMust be by The Book, THE BOSTON GLOBE,Jan. 2, 2000.

34

38
39

Bengals owner Mike Brown declared this week he would not make head coach Bruce Coslet
or his staff 'the scapegoat' for a team that is 4-11 entering today's final game. He said Coslet
and his staff had done a good job of coaching and motivating the Bengals despite the fact
Coslet has the worst winning percentage of any active NFL coach, never has beaten a team
with a winning record on the road since he took over October 21, 1996, and leads the losingest
team of the decade. Brown mistakenly called this loyalty. Star wide receiver Carl Pickens said
he couldn't believe it when he heard the news because "Bruce has never had a winning record
anywhere."
40
Sanders May Rejoin Lions as Non-Player,THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Jan. 23, 2001.
41
See Player Contract,supra note 20.
42
Notebook, KNOXVILLE NEWS-SENTINEL, June 8, 1999, at D5 ("Pickens, 29, has threatened to
sit out the season rather than continue to play for the Bengals, who haven't had a winning record since

554 UNIVERSITY OFMIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:547
eligible for consideration by another club. In response to the behavior of
Pickens, and in particular to his public airing of his grievances with
management, the Bengals management created an addendum to the player's
contract for the 2000 season for the purpose of controlling the content of a
player's comments to the media.
Addendum 1 of the player's contract reads in part as follows:
In the event Player... makes any public comment to the media,
including but not limited to the newspaper, magazines, television,
radio or internet that breaches Player's obligation of loyalty to Club
and/or undermines the public's respect for the Club, Club coaches,
or Club management under Paragraph 2 of Player's NFL Player
Contract and Article LV, Section 6 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement ...upon demand by Club, Player shall forfeit and shall
immediately return and refund to the Club that amount of the
bonus.... "3
The addendum then continues to set forth the dates and conditions for
determination ofthe amount of the bonus to be returned under breach of the
addendum. Finally, the addendum provides a harsh remedy for breach of the
"Player's obligation of loyalty to Club:"
Player hereby expressly authorizes the club, in its sole discretion, to
deduct and set offat any time and from time to time all or part of any
sums owed by Player to Club [in the event of a breach of contract
requiring a refund of signing bonus] from any current or deferred
wages, salaries, bonuses and/or additional consideration owed to
Player by Club."
The controversial clause was taken up by the NFL Player's Association
(on behalf 6f the Bengals players) and submitted to arbitration against the
NFL Management Council (on behalf of the Bengals management). 45 The
Arbitrator upheld the clause on January 17, 2001 in favor of management.46

1990. Pickens made it clear last season that he wanted to leave as a free agent, but the Bengals designated
him their franchise player.").
43
Pickens Clause,supra note 35.
"

Id.

45

See Groeschen, supra note 21, at DOI.
Id.

4
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Ill. PART A - AN UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACT

A. The Doctrine of Unconscionability
The first portion of this comment is intended to examine the contractual
understanding between the Bengals, as management, and the player, as an
employee. Each player signs a contract47 with management that outlines the
agreement between the parties for services to be rendered by the player.
Contracts are often defined as a meeting of the minds, mutual assent, and
mutual agreement.'8 When one of the parties to a contract is treated in an
unfair manner because of the stronger bargaining power of the other party,
the contract is considered void as against public policy.49 The Pickens Clause
removes the right of the player to express himself on a variety of views,
which affect his ability to make a living and practice his trade as a professional
football player. Under the Pickens Clause, players are not free to discuss
their work or workplace conditions without fear of losing all or portions of
their signing bonus. s0 'The manner in which the Bengals demand the player's
assent to this particular clause of the contract is unconscionable. The
following is a discussion of the unconscionability of the Pickens Clause.
1. HISTORIC VIEW
As early as 1870, the Supreme Court addressed unconscionability: "Ifa
contract be unreasonable and unconscionable, but not void for fraud, a court
of law will give to the party who sues for its breach damages, not according
to its letter, but only such as he is equitably entitled to."-' In 1912,
unconscionability was said to underlie "practically the whole content of the
law of equity." 2 Judge Skelly Wright's language from the more recent
seminal case on point, Williams v. Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo., stated that:
7
4

See Katz, supra note 27.

See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 983 (6th ed. 1990), citing Rice v. McKinley, 590 S.W. 2d 305,

306 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979) ("Meeting of minds. An essential element of contract is mutual agreement and
assent of parties to contract to substance and terms. It isan agreement reached by the parties to a contract
and expressed therein, or as the equivalent of mutual assent or mutual obligation.").
49
See id. at 1525 (Unconscionable bargain or contract.).
so
See Pickens Clause, supra note 35.
5'
Williams v.Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445,448 (D.C. Cir. 19 65),citing Scott v.
United States, 79 U.S. 443,445 (1870).
52
JOHN D. CALAMARI &JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS S 9.38 (4th ed. 1998)
(quoting Teeven, Declineof Freedom of Contract Since the Emergenceof the Modern Business Corporation, 37 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 117, 136-40 (1992)).
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"[i]t has been held as5 a3 matter of common law that unconscionable contracts
are not enforceable."
2. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

The doctrine of unconscionability, though deeply rooted in the common
law of equity, was ultimately codified in the Uniform Commercial Code:
If the court, as a matter of law, finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made, the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the
remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it
may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result.'
This oft-criticized provision of the U.C.C. provides substantial leeway
to the courts to apply the doctrine of unconscionability with very little
guidance on the legal meaning of the term unconscionability. Comment 1
to U.C.C. Section 2-302(1) does little to assist in the understanding of the
legal meaning of the term "unconscionable." It reads as follows: "The basic
test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the
commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so
one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the
time of the making of the contract.""5 This portion of Comment 1 leaves us
with a basic circular test that defines unconscionability as that which is
unconscionable. However, the comment goes on to say that: "[t] he principle
is one of prevention of oppression and unfair surprise ... and not of
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power."56
Williams provided additional guidance on the matter stating that: "Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party." 7 One often-quoted
interpretation of the term originated with the Supreme Court in 1889 that
referred to bargain as one which was "such as no man in his senses and not

53
Williams, 350 F.2d at 448, citing Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. Pa. 1948);
Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Sparks, 172 N.E.2d 899 (1961); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,

Inc., 161 A.2d 69,84-96(1960). Cf.1CORBIN, CONTRACTS
54
U.C.C. S 2-302(1) (2000).
55
Id. at Comment 1.
56
57

Id.
Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.

S

128 (1963).
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under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man
would accept on the other...."5s
Professor Arthur Leff, writing soon after the adoption of the U.C.C., is
credited with the development of a two-prong view: "substantive
unconscionability" and "procedural unconscionability." s9 "Those two
concepts were introduced by Professor Leff to distinguish between
'bargaining naughtiness' (procedural unconscionability) and 'evils in the
resulting contract' (substantive unconscionability)." 60 The courts now
generally view the U.C.C. as requiring both procedural and substantive
unconscionability before they will grant relief from a challenged term.6' For
example, in Williams,JudgeWright found an unconscionable contract is one
that combines "an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties [procedural unconscionabilityl together with contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party [substantive unconscionSome courts have suggested that the concept is a mathematical
ability].
formula where a large amount of one type of unconscionability makes up for
a shortfall in another type of unconscionability.Y3 In general, the whole
doctrine ofunconscionability appears to be disconcerting at best. One author
has said that, "[t] he conflict between what the courts said they were doing
and what they were in fact doing has had an unsettling effect on the law,
giving the sensitive a feeling of lawlessness, the logician a feeling of
irrationality and the average lawyer a feeling of confusion."'
3. THE MODERN VIEW OF UNCONSCIONABILIFY
In addition, the doctrine of unconscionability has entered into the
general law of contracts outside the coverage of Article 2 of the U.C.C. and
Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406,415 (1889).
Richard Craswell & Carolyn Craig, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and
RelatedDoctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1993), citing Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionabilityand the Code -- The
Emperor's Nev Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485,487 (1967).
58

59

6o

Id.

61

Id.

S
63
64

Williamns, 350 F.2d at 449 (D. Cal. 2000).
Craswell & Craig, supra note 59.
Calamari, supra note 52, at S 9.38. The footnote to this comment reads:
"The statement of an Eastern sage may here be apposite: 'Now if names of things are not
defined, words will not correspond to facts. When words do not correspond to facts, it is
impossible to perfect anything. Where it is impossible to perfect anything, the arts and
institutions of civilization cannot flourish, law andjustice do not attain their ends; and when
law and justice do not attain their ends, the people will be at a loss to know what to do.'
Confucius, The Analects, xiii, 3. We are indebted for this reference to Jackson, 53 L.Q. REV.
525, 536 (1937)."
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has been accepted as a general doctrine of law by the American Law Institute
Restatement, Second, Contracts:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the
contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
term, or may so limit the application of any unconscionable term as
to avoid any unconscionable result.6'
The law of unconscionability has been applied to any number of
transactions outside the U.C.C. For instance, in a professional services case,
the courts used the law of unconscionability to find that a real estate services
contract was unconscionable where a real estate broker demanded payment
for services rendered after having found a buyer for his client's house but
where the buyer failed to complete the purchase of the house. 66 The NFL
player's contract is a contract for services, not goods, 67 as defined by the
U.C.C. However, if the law of unconscionability applies to service contracts
with real estate agents, then the law would apply to service contracts with a
professional football player.
B. Unconscionabilityand the Pickens Clause
NFL players sign a standardized agreement known as the NFL Player
Contract.' This agreement is periodically re-negotiated between the Club
owners and the NFL Players Association. The loyalty clause69 referred
throughout this paper is a separate addendum added to the standardized NFL
agreement. The Bengals have presented this "take it or leave it" clause as a
condition of employment to the players. The issue over the loyalty clause
was submitted to arbitration where the arbitrator found in favor of the
Club.7" The player currently has no choice but to sign the addendum if he
wants to be employed by the Bengals. 7' The players simply do not have a
meaningful choice as required under Williams.7 2 They must sign the
provision or look for another Club.
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS Ch. 9 S 208 (1981).
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Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1967).
U.C.C. S 2-105(1) (2000).
See Player Contract, supra note 20.
See Pickens Clause, supra note 35.
Groeschen, supra note 21, at DOI.
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Substantive unconscionability involves oppression of one ofthe parties. 7'
The loyalty clause is nothing more than an effort by the Club to use its
superior bargaining powers to oppress its players. However, superior
bargaining power must be coupled with an additional element such as "lack
of meaningful choice" or a situation where the superior party has control
over the negotiations because of the "weaker party's ignorance, feebleness,
unsophistication as to... business concepts, or general naivet6."7 4 Although
many of the players are well educated with college degrees, and presumably
savvy agents represent most of the players, it is probable that few, if any, of
the players have the individual business acumen to fully understand the
allocation of risk under the Pickens Clause.7" Reportedly, some of these
young players have never even had a personal checking account. One player,
as an example asked that he be paid with cashier's checks. Upon inquiry by
his agent, the player admitted that he did not know how to obtain a checking
account.76 Arguably, in order to mitigate the risk, the players are represented
by seasoned sports agents, attorneys and accountants. However, even with
the best expert counseling, it is the player who must understand the
allocation of risk between a potential unintended statement under pressure
and the amount of money. "Amid a pressurized sport that includes clashing
egos, contrasting personalities and mood swings,""7 the player is expected,
under the Pickens Clause to remain completely in control of his expressions
both on and off the field. The players are expected to wreak havoc on the
See id.
Calamari, supra note 52, at S 9.40.
75
See, e.g., Carucci,supra note 1.
In a skit preformed at the NFL's fifth annual Rookie Symposium, "a rookie player
returns home from the symposium to find that his brother, whom he had asked to watch his
house while he was away, had arranged for him to receive $20,000 of stolen merchandise for
$2,500. The player insists he had never asked for the arrangement, and suddenly finds himself
in a dilemma. Before the matter could be resolved, Minor, [the skit prompter], ordered the
actors to 'freeze!' Then he walked around the audience, asking players what they would do in
such a circumstance.
One said he would refuse the merchandise and perhaps call the police. But another
said that '80 percent' of the players in the room would probably accept the deal because that's
what their street-minded instincts would tell them to do.
'I think the young man was correct, and that's why we do this,' said Minor, who has taught in
New York's public schools and who has counseled inmates. 'And we present it (in the form
of a skit) because it's what they do for a living. You practice for that game. Now, we're going
to practice for life.
Primarily, for these guys, it's just understanding youth and what coming from
nothing (financially) can expose you to, and how you will risk certain things and how you've
got to be educated about the new opportunities that you have.'"
76
See Katz, supra note 27.
n
Bell, supra note 2, at IC.
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football field78 and expose themselves to life-threatening conditions79 or
serious personal injury' without saying anything negative or embarrassing
This is an unreasonable and
about their coaches or teammates.
unconscionable expectation given the conditions and risk these players are
exposed to while providing their sports entertainment services under
personal service contracts. In general, a 22 year-old draft pick simply does
not have the business acumen or worldly experience to fully understand that
even a casual comment, whether intended or not, could cause him to lose
$10 million dollars without a due process hearing on the matter. This
possible expensive consequence of his words is up to the "sole discretion" of
the Club."' There are few situations in the business world where one
contracting party knowingly, consciously, and voluntary jeopardizes such a
large portion of his property at the "sole discretion" of another party to a
contract.
IV. PART B - RESTRAINT ON FREE EXPRESSION
The second portion of this article is intended to examine the player's
right of free expression under the U.S. Constitution and as a member of the
NFL Player's Association.
A. The Right to Free Expression

1. FREE EXPRESSION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT
"Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to
conscience, above all liberties."8 Freedom of speech is one of the most
valued liberties of a nation of free persons. Free expression is tested in the
federal courts with great frequency and emotion including such pressing
current issues ranging from a grandmother's right to take nude photos of her
grandchildren 3 to a teenager's right to wear a tee shirt proclaiming himself

See Velin, supra note 3, at 3C.
See Gary Mihoces, Death Rocks Football World, Vikings' Stringer a Victim of Heatstroke at Training
Camp, USA TODAY, Aug. 2,2001, at 1. On Aug. 1,2001, one ofthe NFL's top players, Vikings's offensive
tackle Korey Stringer died from heatstroke after working out in training camp with the team.
8o
See Ludwig, supra note 24.
81
See, e.g., Pickens Clause, supra note 35 (emphasis added).
8
EXPRESS YOURSELF: The Free Speech Editorial Page, The Thomas Jefferson Center for
Free Expression, at http-//www.jcenter.org/index.html (quotingJohn Milton, The Areopagitica, (1644)).
83
The Associated PressFederalJudge Ordes Nude PhotosofGrandkids Retumed to GrandmotherJune
20,2001.
78
79
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to be a redneck.' The importance of free expression to our national
consciousness is underlined by its position as the very first amendment to the
Constitution of the United States: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise hereof, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."' 5 The First Amendment applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment: "[N]o state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States..."86 The protection afforded individuals under the U.S. Constitution
applies to state action and not necessarily to actions of private parties.
However, a few states, such as Massachusetts and Connecticut have Civil
Rights Acts, which protect an employee's speech interest against private
employersY Connecticut, in particular has an explicit statutory provision
aimed at protection of an employee's First Amendment rights:
Any employer . . . who subjects any employee to discipline or
discharge on account of the exercise by such employee of rights
guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution
or section 3, 4 or 14 of article first of the Constitution of the state,
provided such activity does not substantially or materially interfere
with the employee's bona fide job performance or the working
relationship between the employee and the employer, shall be liable
to such employee for damages caused by such discipline or
discharge, including punitive damages, and for reasonable attorney's
fees as part of the costs of any such action for damages.88
Additionally, a private employer may be considered a state actor in some
circumstances thereby granting First Amendment protection to the
employee.'

84
86
97

The Associated Press, Teen Sues N.J. School Over Suspension for Redneck T-shirt, June 26,2001.
U.S. Const. amend. I.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
See Lewis Kurlantzick, Symposiun:JohnRocker:John Rocker and Employee DisciplineforSpeech, 11

MARQ. SPoRTs L.J. 185 (2001).
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Id. at 191-192 (quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 31-51q (West 1999)).
See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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2. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF FREE EXPRESSION
Influenced by the works of the early Greeks, the English poet and
philosopherJohn Milton is recognized as the author of the "earliest complete
statement of the absolute protection to be accorded controversial ideas" 9°
with his writing of his 1644 tract,Areopagitka. "In his choice of title, Milton
alludes to an analogous written oration of Socrates presented in 355 B.C. to
the Athenian Ecclesia, advocating a return of certain powers to the
aristocratic Council of the Areopagus." 91 Milton expressed his views on free
expression in the Areopagitica, a speech for the liberty of unlicensed printing
delivered to the parliament of England:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the
earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and
prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open
encounter?9
John Locke, "opposed the licensing system because it 'injured the
printing trade.' 9 3
The nineteenth century philosopher, John Stuart Mills espoused his
ideas on the importance of unpopular speech in his essay On Liberty:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that
it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than
those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the
opportunity of exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what
is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier
impression of truth, produced by its collision with error.9

o
Jonathan Blumen, The Ethical Spectacle, Freedom of Speech, (Feb. 1996), available at
httpA'/www.spectacie.org/296/rulebL html.
91
Id.
9r

JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA (1644).

Reprinted by: Renascence Editions, available at

http//www.uorgon.edu/- rbear/areopagitica.htm.
9

Id.

(quoting LEONARD W. LEVY, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON

(Bobbs-Merrill) (1966)).
Blumen, supra note 90 (quoting JOHN

Green, and Co.) (1865)).

STUART MILLS,

ON LIBERTY (London, Longmans,
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Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes eloquently set forth his
views on the importance of free speech in our American society:
[W] hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas -- that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.'
Justice Holmes, in his 1925 dissent in Gitlow v. New York, 96 defines free
speech as the right to expressive belief: "If in the long run the beliefs
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that
they should be given their chance and have their way." 97
B. State Employee's Right of Free Expression
1. THE BENGALS AS A STATE ACTOR
The provisions of the Bill of Rights were intended to apply to the federal
government. Later, the provisions of the Bill of Rights are applicable to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment. "As a general matter the
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment do not extend to 'private conduct
abridging individual rights." 98 The First Amendment does not constrain
private employers, private universities, private organizations, or private
individuals. The free expression protections run to protecting the individual
from state actions. State action is present when the speech is restricted,
dictated, or influenced by the government. Private employers are not the
government. However, depending upon the circumstances, there are
exceptions where a private party may be considered a state actor.

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
%6 Gitlow v. NewYork, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).

9
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Id. at 673.

9

NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (quoting Burton, 365 U.S. at 722).
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a. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority
The Bengals Club is a private corporation leasing a public stadium from
Hamilton County, Ohio. In a nearly identical example of a private
corporation leasing space from the state, the Supreme Court found that the
private entity was a state actor.9 In Burton,1°°the court found that "when a
State leases public property in the manner and for the purpose shown to have
been the case here [in Burton], the proscriptions of the Fourteenth
Amendment must be complied with by the lessee as certainly as though they
were binding covenants written into the agreement itself."' 0' The private
corporation leasing space from the state and taking advantage of the public
benefits that pass through the state lease becomes, for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes, a "state actor." In Burton, the City of Wilmington,
Delaware, created a parking authority "to provide adequate parking facilities
for the convenience of the public and thereby relieve the 'parking crisis,
,,,.0"
Then, the newly
which threatens the welfare of the community.
created Wilmington Parking Authority ("Authority") acquired land and
constructed a parking garage in downtown Wilmington.' °3 The garage was
financed with tax-exempt revenue bonds"' and the parking garage structure
itself was "likewise exempt form state taxation. " 'Os In order to re-pay the
revenue bonds, the parking authority determined that it needed to enter
long-term leases with commercial tenants for some of the space in the
garage.) ° Thereafter, the Authority advertised for commercial tenants and
ultimately entered into leases with various commercial tenants including a
long-term, 20-year lease plus a 10-year renewal lease option with the Eagle
Coffee Shoppe ("Eagle"). 0 7
The Authority made certain physical
improvements to the space in accordance with the needs of Eagle.
Additionally, Eagle spent $220,000 on improvements to the space that were
tax-exempt under the Authority's status as a tax-exempt entity. "The
Authority further agreed to furnish heat for Eagle's premises, gas service for
the boiler room, and to make, at its own expense, all necessary structural

9

See Burton, 365 U.S. at 715.

100

Id.

1t

Id. at 726.
Id. at 717.

102
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See id. at 718.
See id.
Id. at 718.
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See id. at 719.
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repairs, all repairs to exterior surfaces except store fronts and any repairs
caused by lessee's own act or neglect.""~ After Eagle began its operations,
Mr. Burton, a black gentleman, entered the shop where Eagle "refused to
serve appellant [Burton] food or drink solely because he is [was] a Negro."' °9
At trial, the issue was whether Eagle, as a private corporation, had a
responsibility to behave as a state actor because of the state-financed lease,
ongoing state maintenance support during operations and the benefit of
waiver of taxes." The Delaware Court of Chancery "concluded... that
whether in fact the lease was a 'device' or was executed in good faith, it
would not 'serve to insulate the public authority from the force and effect of
the Fourteenth Amendment.'""' On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery and held that Eagle "'in the
conduct of its business, is [was] acting in a purely private capacity. ' " 12 The
U.S. Supreme Court said "'[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights is not
the subject-matter of the amendment,'... and that private conduct abridging
individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to
some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found
to have become involved in it." t 3 The court continued, "[o]nly by sifting
facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the
State in private conduct be attributed its true significance."" 4 After analyzing
all of the assistance granted by and through the state to Eagle, a private
corporation, the Court concluded that:
By its inaction, the Authority, and through it the State, has not only
made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place
its power, property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination.
The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot
be considered to have been so "purely private" as to fall without the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment."'

108

Id. at 720.

109

Id. at 716.

110

See id.
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Id. at 720 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 150 A.2d 197, 198 (Del. Ch. 1959),

rev'd Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Burton, 157 A.2d 894, (Del. 1960), rev'd Burton, 365 U.S. 715).
Id. at 721 (quoting Wilmington, 157 A2d at 902).
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An examination of the lease agreement between the Bengals and the
Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County, Ohio reveals an even
stronger interdependence between the government (Hamilton County,
Ohio) and a private corporation, Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., than the case
presented in Burton. 16 To begin with, the stadium leased by the Bengals
from the Hamilton County is a single-use facility for all intents and
purposes, that was designed and built for the primary purpose of playing
NFL football games. This facility serves no other public purpose, as was the
case in Burton where the coffee shop was merely an ancillary addition to the
parking garage, the primary purpose of the structure. 1 7 Under Burton, the
coffee shop lessee, Eagle, not only paid its own way; it actually supplemented
the payment of the public revenue bonds for the parking garage." 8 Under
the Bengals lease, Hamilton County pays for the stadium through a one-half
cent sales tax levy on the citizens of Hamilton County. 19 The Bengals
actually pay only a nominal amount of rent on a declining schedule for the
first nine years of the lease and thereafter pay nothing for the preferential use
of the publicly-financed and publicly-owned football stadium.'20 In
exchange for lease payments totaling just under $12,000,000.00121 over the
first nine years, the Bengals receive the use and control of the stadium for up

116

See Memorandum of Understanding for the Hamilton County Football Stadium dated Sept.

11, 1996; Lease Agreement By and Between The Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County, Ohio
and Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. Dated as of May 29, 1997; Amendment of Lease Agreement for Paul Brown
Stadium datedJan. 31, 1998; Second Amendment of Lease Agreement for Paul Brown Stadium dated Apr.
10,1998 and Third Amendment of Lease Agreement for Paul Brown Stadium By and Between The Board
of Commissioners of Hamilton County, Ohio and Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. dated June 24,2000 available
from the Office of the County Attorney, Hamilton County, Ohio (LeaseAgreemnen 0 .
117

See Burton, 365 U.S. 715.
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Id.
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See Lease Agreement supra note 116, at 1. By public vote on Mar. 19, 1996, the citizens of

Hamilton County passed a one-half percent increase in the Hamilton County general sales tax to keep
competitive and viable major league football and baseball teams in Cincinnati, Ohio by, among other
things, the construction of a new football stadium in Hamilton County.
'
See id. at 24. Under Article 6, the Bengals pay an annual rent as follows:
Year I
$1,700,000.00
Year 2
$1,600,000.00
Year 3
$1,500,000.00
Year 4
$1,400,000.00
Year 5
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Year 7
$1,100,000.00
Year 8
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Year 9
$900,000.00
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Id.
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to thirty-sixyears at a cost to the taxpayers of $753,000,000.00'" plus the cost
of maintenance and upkeep. Conceivably, the ultimate cost to the taxpayers
could run up to one billion dollars,2 3 offset only by a nominal lease payment
from the Bengals.
In Burton, Eagle, the coffee shop, was exempt from real estate taxes for
improvements attached to the property. 24 Under the Bengals lease, the
Bengals are exempt from payment of both real estate taxes and personal
property taxes. 12 The Bengals lease also has a provision providing that
should any such taxes be imposed onto the Bengals, "such impositions will
be paid by County." 126 Hamilton County also pays for all utilities;
maintenance and upkeep of the stadium and the Bengals retain the revenue
from concessions and parking surrounding the stadium. 1 2 The initial lease
went so far as to guarantee the sale of 50,000 tickets for each of the first
twenty home games played at the stadium.' 2 Around the country, there has
been an explosion of new stadiums built at taxpayer expense over the past
decade.' - The manner in which government has financed huge new
stadiums at public expense to benefit private parties has been referred to as
a process involving "deceptive politicians, taxpayer swindles, media slants, the
power of big money, and most of all, a political system that serves the rich
and powerful at the expense of the average fan, the average taxpayer, the
average citizen." 30 "In short . states and municipalities purport to be
public servants - with the interest of the average taxpayer in mind - but in
reality opt to subsidize the corporate ventures of team owners at the expense
of taxpayers."' 3 ' Because of this overt subsidization of private sports teams,
one commentator has suggested that in a case "where the public sector has
paid at least fifty percent of the cost for the playing facility, they in turn

1=

The stadium, by one report costs $400,300,000.00 plus interest payments, totaling more than

$353,000,000.00 over the thirty year life of the revenue bonds issued to build the stadium. See Lucy May,
Stadimn Tab Tops $753 M County Hopes It Can PayOffEarly, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, May 21,1998.
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should be entitled the right of first refusal to purchase the team. " 132 Teams
would be publicly owned just like a local utility company.' 33
Upon examination of the Bengals lease with Hamilton County,
compared to the Eagle lease under Burton, it is clear that an even stronger
interdependence exists where the Supreme Court found under Burton that
it "it [the lessee Eagle] must be recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be considered to have
been so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 34 The weight of the facts and circumstances under the
Bengals lease leave the Bengals, for purposes ofthe Fourteenth Amendment,
a state actor.
b. Stadium Lease Mandate
Under Burton, the Supreme Court found that the state "could have
affirmatively required Eagle to discharge the responsibilities under the
Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon the private enterprise as a
consequence ofstate participation."135 Hamilton County apparently intended
to impose upon the Bengals its responsibilities under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3 6 The lease between the Bengals and The Board of
Commissioners of Hamilton County, Ohio actually includes an
antidiscrimination clause, which creates an obligation on the part of the
Bengals to comply with all of the employment practices required of a
governmental agency:
32.10 Antidiscrimination Clause. Neither Team nor County shall
discriminate on the basis of race, color, political or religious opinion or
affiliation, creed, age, physical or mental handicap, sex, marital status,
ancestry or national origin. The Lease shall comply with all
applicable state, local and federal laws, rules, regulations, executive
orders, and agreements pertaining to discrimination in employment,
37
unlawful employment practices and affirmative action.

132
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The so-called loyalty clause imposed by the Bengals upon its players
chills the player's individual right to political opinion to the extent that his
expressions might undermine "the public's respect for the Club, Club
coaches, or Club management." 3 Additionally, the Bengals have an
affirmative obligation to avoid any "discrimination in employment " 139 as if
they were a state actor under the Antidiscrimination Clause of their lease
with Hamilton County.
2. FREE EXPRESSION CASES FOR STATE WORKERS

The Bengals, by their lease contract 1" are required to comply with
employment law free speech standards as described in these cases as if they
were a state rather than private employer. The following cases outline the
obligation of state employers.
Employees of the state are entitled to freely criticize their employer.
Similar to the intent of the Pickens Clause, in Pickeringv. Boardof Education,"
a teacher was fired by the school board for writing a letter criticizing his
employer, the board of education. 4 2 The issue in the case was whether the
teacher, as a state employee, had a duty to support management's decision,
or whether he had a right, as a citizen, to speak freely on a current political
issue. The U.S. Supreme Court considered the balance between these two
principles and ultimately held that raising the issue of expenditure of tax
money "is a matter of legitimate public concern."'43 "This Court has also
indicated, in more general terms, that statements by public officials on
matters of public concern must be accorded First Amendment protection
despite the fact that the statements are directed at their nominal superiors."'"
The public concern in this case outweighed the employee's duty of loyalty
to management and preserved Pickering's right to freedom of speech over his
loyalty to his employer.
State employee's speech will not prevent a state agency from dismissing
the employee if there are mitigating factors that would have in any case led
to the employee's dismissal. The fact that free expression constitutes one of
the infractions claimed by an agency would not protect the employee from
other factors that led to his dismissal. For instance, in Mt. Healthy City Sch.
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Pickens Clause, supra note 35.
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Lease Agreement, supra note 116, at 68.
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See id.
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143
144

570 UNIVERSITY OFMIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:547
Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. Doyle, a public school teacher, Doyle, was dismissed for
having called a local radio station in which he "communicated the substance
of the school principal's memorandum on teacher dress and appearance to a
local radio station which used his communication in a newscast."' 45 The
radio station reported the memorandum as a news item.' 46 The District
Court held that the teacher's communication to the radio station was "clearly
protected by the First Amendment," and that because it had played a
"substantial part" in the decision of the Board not to retain the teacher, he
was entitled to reinstatement with back pay.' 4' The Court of Appeals
affirmed the findings of the District Court.' The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, held that the Board could lawfully discharge Doyle if the Board
could show by "a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached
the same decision as to respondent's re-employment even in the absence of
the protected conduct. " 149 The effect of this decision was to make it more
difficult for employees to be reinstated in a free speech case where there were
mitigating factors that might have influenced a state employer's decision to
fire an employee. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Majority, stated that
"constitutionally protected conduct" should not be used to continue the
employment of a "borderline or marginal candidate."' After the Doyle case,
an employer need only show some other cause for dismissing an employee
in order to avoid the violation of an employee's right of free expression.
The Supreme Court has interpreted protected speech to be "political,
social, or other concern to the community"15' not speech on matters relating
to the internal operations of a particular governmental agency. In Connick v.
Myers, an attorney was dismissed from her job in the office of the District
Attorney of New Orleans for distributing a questionnaire to other attorneys
within the office. 2 Myers' questionnaire addressed issues "concerning
office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the
level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to
work in political campaigns."'5 3 The District Attorney considered Myers'
distribution of the questionnaire to be an act of insubordination. The U.S.
District Court, relying on Pickering, found Myers employment to be
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wrongfully terminated, because she had exercised her right of free speech,'"
and awarded Myers "full back pay from the date of her wrongful
termination," attorneys fees, and $1,500 for her "emotional and mental
distress." 's5 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's rulingwithout an
5 6 The U.S. Supreme Court overruled both lower courts while
opinion."
modifying the law established in Pickering by declaring that thirteen of the
fourteen questions on Myers' questionnaire were not a matter of "legitimate
public concern."5 7 The Court held that "[wihile as a matter of good
judgment, public officials should be receptive to constructive criticism
offered by their employees, the First Amendment does not require a public
office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office
affairs."" 8 The Supreme Court also said "[wihen employee expression
cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide
latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by thejudiciary
in the name of the First Amendment." s9
The overall effect of Myers was to deny government employees
protection for anything other than political speech. The court dismissed
matters raised by Myers pertaining to the operation of the district attorney's
office, a quasi-state office. The Myers decision further distanced the right of
free speech from the efficient management of government continuing to
weaken the Supreme Court's previous holding in Pickering. The Court's five
to four holding in Myers reflects a shift in political orientation of the Justices
of the Court compared to the orientation of the Justices who were present
on the bench in the 1968 Pickering decision that rendered a broader
interpretation ofthe free expression protections available to employees of the
government.
Matters of public concern do not necessarily include speech on matters
relating to the internal management of a governmental agency. Subsequent
to the decision in Myers, the Supreme Court in Waters v. Churchill,"6
considered the case involving Cheryl Churchill, a nurse, who was employed
in the obstetrics department ofa government-owned hospital. Ms. Churchill
was overheard having a conversation with another nurse in the lunchroom
concerning a potential transfer into the obstetrics department during which
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Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. La. 1981).
Id. at 760.
Myers v. Connick, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981) rev'd, 461 U.S. 138 (1982).
Myers, 654 F.2d 719.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 146.
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
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she allegedly criticized her superiors and stated that the conditions were poor
in the obstetrics department.' The nurse who overheard the conversation
elected not to transfer to the obstetrics department allegedly because of the
criticisms leveled by Churchill. 62 Because the employee decided not to
transfer to the obstetrics department because of Churchill's open criticism
of her supervisors, the hospital board fired Churchill." Churchill then sued
the hospital for violation of her civil rights."6 The U.S. District Court for
the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment.' 65 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that there was a
question of fact of the content of Churchill's speech." 6 The Seventh Circuit
held that Churchill's speech was "most certainly a matter of public concern"
and "undoubtedly... a matter of public concern" that was protected under
Myers. 67 The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Seventh Circuit and held
that the operative test was not what the jury or court believed, but rather
what the governmental employer reasonably believed.'8 The Supreme
*Court granted deference to the state and said that government should be able
to manage its employees in an efficient way. 69 The Supreme Court clarified
the role of the government as an employer as compared to the government
as a sovereign with an obligation to respect freedom of speech for all
citizens. 7° The Supreme Court went on to say, "management can only
spend so much of their time on any one employee decision."' 7' Churchillwas
a plurality decision by four Justices, which further weakened the employees'
rights under Myers. Three of the Justices concurred in the result, but
preferred not to overturn the results in Pickering and Myers.172 Two of the
Justices (Stevens and Blackmun) dissented, stating, "[t]hat Churchill's
statements were fully protected by the First Amendment. " '"
In Myers, the Supreme Court held that protected speech must be related
to matters of "political, social, or other concern to the community." 7 4 In
161
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Churchill, the Supreme Court found that the state should be able to manage
its business without interference from the courts.175 Arguably then, when
viewed under Myers and Churchill, the issue of whether a player's statement
on or off the field about the Bengals players, coaches or management was
protected speech under the First Amendment, might come down to whether
a player's expression was of public concern to the community or one of
internal concern by the Bengals' management. 7 6 In this case, the community has a one billion-dollar obligation at stake in the Bengals.' 7 It is hard to
imagine any foreseeable statement about the management of the team that
the public does not have a vested interest in knowing about unless it is false,
libelous, and based on vitriol. Legitimate, objective comments about the
Bengals management, staff, coaches, or players made by a player with
personal knowledge could serve a valuable public function. Actually, the
players may be the only check the citizens have regarding the management
of this privately owned corporation in which the community has invested
such a substantial sum of money. Any fact-based, legitimate opinion
regarding the management and operations of the Bengals could constitute
vital public information. Based on the billion-dollar investment made with
taxpayer dollars in professional sports, the millions of dollars invested by
various media and other businesses dedicated to the coverage of sports it may
be concluded that information about sports facilities, personnel, management
and events is a vital concern to the public at large. Currently there are
hundreds of sports talk radio stations and at least dozens of television
178
networks around the country dedicated to coverage of national sports.
Sports information is a vital social concern to the public at large particularly
where the community had increased taxes and made a substantial investment
in a privately owned football team.
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networks:
See, e.g., Lone Star Satellite Communications, C-Band/ 4DTV-' Digital Channel Line-Up
where the listing of sports channels include the following networks: CNN/SI, ESPN, ESPN2
Alternate (VCII format), ESPN2 Alternate (Clear format), ESPN Classic Sports, ESPN2,
ESPNews, Fit TV, Fox Sports and SportsChannel Feeds, Fox Sports Net Base, Fox Sports Net
Base 2, Fox Sports Americas, Fox Sports Northwest, Fox Sports West (Los Angeles), Fox
Sports West 2, Fox Sports World, Golf Channel, Golf Channel, Home Team Sorts, Madison
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C. Free Expression - NFL PlayersAssociation Collective Bargaining
Agreement
1. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASSOCIATION

The National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA") is an
organized labor union organization that represents the NFL players.' 79 The
NFL was organized in 1920 but the players were not represented until
1956."'0 "[T]he NFL has been the sight (sic) of some of the most virulent
labor-relations battles in professional sports."'"' The players suffered from
poor treatment, low pay, and deplorable working conditions.'8 2 In 1956, the
Cleveland Browns players began league-wide organizational efforts that led
to the creation of the NFL Player's Association to represent the players. 3
In 1957, the Supreme Court held that the NFL was in subject to the antitrust
laws under the Sherman Act."s Radovich was a landmark case for the players,
which began a long road toward recognition under a Collective Bargaining
Agreement.'8 During the 1960's, conflict occurred with the creation of the
new American Football League and resulting AFL Player's Association.
Ultimately, the two groups merged and the newly merged NFLPA was6
certified by the National Labor Relations Board to represent the players.1
The struggle for representation continued throughout the 1970's and 80's:
first, with a strike in 1974, when the owners refused to participate in
collective bargaining; second, with a 1976 decision by the Eighth Circuit
finding the owners guilty of violating federal labor and antitrust laws; 7 then
with a strike in 1982 because the owners had refused to bargain with the
NFLPA; and finally with a strike in 1987.
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During the strike in 1987, the owners, rejecting the players' free agency
demands, used scab players to continue the season."s The players returned
to finish the season without an agreement and the scabs were let go. 9
Realizing that collective bargaining was not going to work because the clubs
were acting as a monopoly, the NFLPA filed an antitrust lawsuit against the
owners. The District Court for Minnesota ruled that because of the
bargaining impasse, the owners were no longer entitled to their exemption
to continue restrictive practices under the antitrust laws.' On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit overturned the lower court decision holding that the players
would have to "choose between being a union and using their right to strike
under labor laws, or relinquishing their union rights and pursing their
antitrust rights as individuals in court." 9' To the surprise of the owners, the
NFLPA abandoned its status as a labor union, re-formed a professional
association of players, with the primary purpose of supporting individual
litigation by the players. The reformed players' association paid for several
cases challenging the illegal practices of the NFL including the landmark case
McNeil P.NFL,'92 where thejury found that the owners had violated antitrust
laws by restricting players to a first refusal/compensation system that denied
the top thirty-seven players from each team free agency status. 93 Not long
thereafter, in 1992, the owners and players settled their differences with an
agreement between the parties. 9 4 The NFLPA applied for and was certified
again as a union by the National Labor Relations Board in March of 1993.'95
After meeting almost daily through the month of May of 1993, the parties
then reached agreement on a new, five-year Collective Bargaining
Agreement 96 that was later extended for another five years through 2003"9
and extended again through 2007.198 While there has been a decline of labor
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2001, available at httpV/ca.sports.yahoo.com/010606/6/5rco.html:
The NFL will have labour peace through 2007 once the league and the players ratify Tuesday's
agreement to extend the collective bargaining agreement for three years. The NFL
Management Council and players' association agreed to extend the salary cap through 2006,
with the final year of the extension an uncapped season. The players and league owners must
vote on the agreement, but that is considered a formality, particularly for the players, who
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organization membership and power over the past thirty years, the NFLPA
has emerged and only recently achieved effective functioning by reaching a
working agreement between professional football players and management."
The rights of NFL players are protected by virtue of their status, as members
of a union. It has changed the face of professional football. Critical to the
continued success of the professional football labor movement is a player's
ability to speak freely on matters that concern the professional football labor
members.
2.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT ANTIDISCRIMINATION
CLAUSE

In addition to the antidiscrimination clause contained in the lease
between the Bengals and Hamilton County, °0 the NFL Collective
Bargaining Agreement 1993-2003-"' contains a clause intended to prevent
discrimination against the players which reads as follows: "Section 1. No
Discrimination: There will be no discrimination in any form against any
player by the Management Council, [m] any Club or by the NFLPA because
of race, religion, national origin or activity or lack of activity on behalf of the
NFLPA."2 3 Activity, which may include expressions to the media, is
protected under this provision of the agreement.
D. Free Expressionand the LaborMovement
1. FREE SPEECH BILL OF RIGHTS

Title 29 of the United States Code ("U.S.C.") contains a provision for
freedom of speech and assembly for members of labor organizations:

could receive an increase in salary to as high as 65.5 per cent of designated gross revenues in
2005.
Marjorie Valbrun, To Reverse Decline, Unions are TargetingItningrant Workers, THE N.Y. TIMES
199
May 27, 1999 ("Labor unions are pouring resources into campaigns to recruit new wave of
immigrant workers, fastest growing segment of working class; hope to reverse 30 years ofdecline in union
membership and power....").
W See Lease Agreenent, supra note 116.
X1
See ColleaiveBargainingAgreenent, supra note 28.
W
Id. at Preamble. "[T]he National Football League Management Council ('Management
Council'), . . . is recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and future
employer member Clubs of the National Football League....
2W Id. at S I (emphasis added).
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Freedom of Speech and Assembly. Every member of any labor
organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with
other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions;
and to express at meetings of labor organization his views, upon
candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any
business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's
established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of
meetings: Provided, that nothing herein shall be construed to impair
the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable
rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the
organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that
would interfere
with its performance of its legal or contractual
20 4
obligations.
The apparent purpose of this provision is to insure that all members of
labor organizations are free to meet together and have equal rights to speak
at meetings and functions of the labor organizations.0 5 The freedom of
speech provision is directed toward the member's expression of his views
regarding candidates for election and other business before the
organization. 2 6 However, the fundamental purpose of a labor organization
is to protect labor's interest against management. Candidates for election to
a labor union post inevitably may run on platforms that are against certain
corporate management policies due to the adversarial relationship between
One might argue that the media could be
labor and management.2'
excluded from labor meetings. However, is that guaranteed? Members of
the media attend organized labor meetings. For example, a cursory search of
the Lexis/Nexis database revealed 478 newspaper stories on file regarding
labor meetings. 20 8 Though the labor movement has declined in recent
years, 9 at one time every major paper in the country had a reporter
dedicated to covering the meetings and business of labor organizations.210
The media maintains an active interest in the business of labor organizations.
If the players are prevented from making expressions that could be
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considered to have "undermine[d] the public's respect for the Club, Club
coaches, or Club management,"21' they will not be able to speak at a labor
union meeting on political and business matters relating to the management
of the team. Fundamentally, the Pickens Clause creates a direct violation of
a player's right to freedom of speech under Title 29 of the U.S. Code,212
because, under the Pickens Clause, the players, are not free to speak on
matters pertaining to management for fear that the media might become
aware of their statements in a meeting.
2. RIGHT TO PICKET

The NFL Players Association went on strike against the NFL Clubs in
1974, 1982, and 1987.213 "The right to picket [is] protected by the provisions
of the Constitution relating to freedom of speech.... p214 The "NLRB
[National Labor Relations Board] has concluded in [an] unfair labor practice
proceeding that... picketing is [also] protected under 29 USCS § 157."215
In 1940, the Supreme Court struck down an Alabama statute that made it
unlawful to picket a place of business finding that "[i]n the circumstances of
our times the dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor
dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is
guaranteed by the Constitution." 216 The Supreme Court also found that "
'[the] streets are natural and proper places for the dissemination of
information and opinion; and one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of
places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised
expression in appropriate
217
in some other place.'"
NFL players, under contractual threat by management, are not free to
exercise their right to picket a labor dispute without fear of losing their
property. 218 The Supreme Court in Thornhill v. Alabama, noted that the
Alabama statute obstructed the "effective means whereby those interested -including the employees directly affected -- may enlighten the public on the
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natur6 and causes ofa labor dispute."219 The Court then went on to hold that
"[t] he safeguarding of these means is essential to the securing ofan informed
and educated public opinion with respect to a matter, which is of public
concern." 22" It is essential that NFL players have the full and unobstructed
ability to picket, publicize, and make known any grievances against
management. Under a contractual clause that provides for loss of pay, a
player is not free to picket or express his differences with club management
if his governing contract states that he can lose all or part of his signing bonus
if he breaches his "loyalty" to management and the Club finds at "its sole
discretion," 22 1 that it undermined the public respect for the "Club, Club
coaches, or Club Management."2 2 A player cannot afford to say anything
negative about management or the Club or coaches. The standard is too
subjective and impossible to define clearly. Anything a player says can be held
against him.
3. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST EMPLOYEES

"The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is the federal legislation that
governs the relationship between employers and employees in the United
States."2'- 3 Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act guarantees that
"[ejmployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection... ."22' An individual
speaker may be considered engaging in a concerted activity if it can be shown
that the individual was "'engaged in, with or on the authority of other
2
employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself.' 2
Therefore, as an example, ifa player complains about a matter and it can
be shown that other players were in agreement with his point of view, then,
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for purposes of Section 7 of the NLRA," 6 the player has engaged in a
concerted activity. The protective guarantee under Section 727 is reinforced
by Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA22 which provides that "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer ... by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization... ."229 This
provision of the Act is aimed at ensuring the right of labor to organize and
represent its interest against management without reprisal from management
for any "concerted activities"2 on the part of labor that may occur in
carrying out its' right to organize. The Pickens Clause penalizes the player
for any so-called disloyal act against management. This fear of reprisal from
management is a direct violation of the National Labor Relations Act, which
provides that "any term or condition of employment to discourage
232
"3
membership in any labor organization 2 ' is an "unfair labor practice."
Arguably, the Pickens Clause was not created for the purpose of discouraging
membership in a labor organization, however, the Pickens Clause absolutely
discourages the free flow of expression necessary to organize and represent
the interests of labor against management.
4. WORKPLACE CONDITIONS
Workplace conditions are one ofthe primary concerns of organized labor
as shown by the establishment of representation of NFL players that grew
out of complaints regarding workplace conditions.2 3 Moreover, safety in the
workplace is a paramount public concern.23 The Section 7 of the NLRA
discussed above provides protection to union members for their actions
taken to protect the interest of the employees. Many states, including Ohio,
have whistleblower statutes, which protect an employee for reporting actions
by employers that are in violation of public policy or the health and safety of
the worker or the public."3 5 Additionally, there has long been a common law
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"basis for protectingwhistleblowers who expose workplace conditions which
violate public policy"? 6 as explained by the Supreme Court of Arizona:
We believe that whistleblowing activity, which serves a public
purpose, should be protected. So long as employees' actions are not
merely private or proprietary, but instead seek to further the public
good, the decision to expose illegal or unsafe practices should be
encouraged. We recognize that there is a tension between the
obvious societal benefits in having employees with access to
information expose activities which may be illegal or which may
jeopardize health and safety, and accepted concepts of employee
loyalty; nevertheless we conclude that on balance actions which
enhance the enforcement of our laws or expose unsafe conditions,
or otherwise serve some singularly public purpose, will inure to the
benefit of the public ...
Professional football players are workers in vulnerable jobs where their
safety is at risk every time they go to work whether on the practice field or
during the course of actual games. "Injuries are very common in this sport
and may end a player's football career." 23s "Pro football players have always
known that their sport is dangerous, that the game's violent collisions can
naturally lead to torn muscles and broken bones, to concussions and
paralysis." 239 One sports commentator has claimed "[olver a period of two
seasons there can be more than 6,000 injuries in professional football.... ,240
Any attempt to quite a player's free expression by a contractual provision that
penalizes a player for his expression on matters relating to management,
coaches and other players violates established public policy and statutes
which provide for the safe harbor reporting by labor of dangerous workplace
conditions.
V. CONCLUSION

The Carl Pickens Clause provision to the player contracts with the
Cincinnati Bengals football team conflicts with public policy and violates
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both common law and statutory standards. It is unconscionable to believe
that a young, twenty year old athlete is capable of fully understanding the
contractual risk he takes by agreeing to a provision that could cause him to
lose millions of dollars as the result ofan inadvertent comment to the media.
Even with financial and legal representation available to explain the
implications of the clause, a twenty year old does not have the depth of
personal life experience to understand that the risk of a mistake far outweighs the negative benefit to the player of the clause.
Because of the depth of public assistance provided to the Bengals, as a
private party, the Bengals are a state actor fully responsible for the individual
rights of their players under the U.S. Constitution. Hamilton County has
increased taxes and assumed a billion-dollar investment for the Bengals in
exchange for a nominal lease amount. The favorable lease terms when
analyzed in full, creates such a strong nexus between the Bengals, as a private
party and Hamilton County, as a subdivision of the state, that the Bengals
become a state actor. To reinforce this principal, the county included an
antidiscrimination lease provision that binds the Bengals to "all applicable
state, local and federal laws, rules, regulations, executive orders and
agreements pertaining to discrimination in employment, unlawful
employment practices and affirmative action 4 ' The Bengals are obligated
to provide a workplace that respects the worker's speech in accordance
federal statutes and the line of cases that protect the workers right of
expression in the workplace.
The player's interest represented by the NFL Player's Association
provides additional protection of their individual right to free expression.
The NFLPA and the NFL have agreed to a Collective BargainingAgreement,
which includes a specific
provision against "discrimination in any form
against any player." 242 The Pickens Clause restriction on speech violates the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Finally, the players are union members whose right to speech is
protected by statutory provisions protecting free speech in connection with
their union activities including, speaking during union meetings without fear
that their remarks might be overheard by the media, the right to express
themselves through publicly picketing the workplace and the right to actively
participate in organizational efforts in the workplace without fear of reprisal
for publicly participating in such activity. Lastly, union members have a right
to report publicly on matters relating to the safety of the workplace.
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When taking into consideration all the ways that the Pickens Clause
violates public policy, violates statutory standards, and runs afoul of the rights
of organized workers, the clause is an offensive provision that should be
eliminated from player contracts. Professional football players are entitled
to full right of free expression as public figures and members of the National
Football League Players Association, a labor union organization.

